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ABSTRACT 
 
The use of appropriate financial incentives within construction projects can contribute 
to strong alignment of project stakeholder motivation with project goals. However, 
effective incentive system design can be a challenging task and takes skilful planning 
by client managers in the early stages of a project. In response to a lack of information 
currently available to construction clients in this area, this paper explores the features 
of a successful incentive system and identifies key learnings for client managers to 
consider when designing incentives. Our findings, based on data from a large 
Australian case study, suggest that key stakeholders place greater emphasis on the 
project management processes that support incentives than on the incentive itself. 
Further, contractors need adequate time and information to accurately estimate 
construction costs prior to their tender price submission to ensure cost-focused 
incentive goals remain achievable. Thus, client managers should be designing 
incentives as part of a supportive procurement strategy to maximize project 
stakeholder motivation and prevent goal misalignment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of financial incentives in construction projects is argued to improve project 
outcomes for the principal (client) and their contract agents (contractors and 
consultants) (Bower et al., 2002; Howard et al., 1997). This is achieved by providing 
the contract agent the opportunity for higher profit margins through a financial reward 
offering, if exceptional performance is achieved. In this way the contract agent shares 
in the client’s success from the project. Generally, the incentive mechanism directs 
contract agent effort towards the achievement of voluntary performance goals (or 
‘higher-order’ goals) beyond minimum contractual specifications in a wide range of 
performance areas such as cost control or schedule performance.  
 
Despite the potential of incentives to improve performance, construction client 
managers face significant challenges in designing incentive mechanisms that 
maximize motivation across a highly interdependent, but contractually fragmented 
project teams. If not designed and implemented carefully, incentives can induce 
undesired behavior and can inhibit the formation of the trust and cooperation between 
client and contract agents (Kadefors, 2004).  
 
Arguably, there is a general assumption in the construction management literature that 
financial incentives automatically promote motivation with little regard to the context 
in which they are applied. However, research undertaken by Bresnen and Marshall 
(2000) suggests that reliance primarily on extrinsic rewards such as financial 
incentives to drive performance improvements can be construed as ‘calculative’. Such 
findings suggest client managers need to understand the limitations of financial 
incentives and the importance of offering them within a complementary procurement 
approach. Unfortunately, current literature provides limited detail as to how this might 
be achieved.  
 
This paper addresses this knowledge gap and examines the client-driven factors that 
promote motivation to achieve voluntary incentive goals on construction projects, 
hereafter referred to as motivation drivers. The case project findings provided here 
form part of a larger study, completed in 2008, into incentive effectiveness in large 
Australian building projects which were commissioned by government clients under 
managing contractor contracts.  
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The previous section highlighted that construction clients face challenges when 
designing incentive systems and indicated that the current literature provides little 
guidance. This paper responds to this gap in the literature by exploring the supporting 
mechanisms and incentive design configurations that can maximize team motivation 
towards voluntary project goals.  
 
Given the lack of research into the impact of incentives on motivation in construction, 
a conceptual framework was developed, based on theoretical evidence, to identify the 
‘motivation drivers’ that impact on incentive goal motivation. By identifying these 
drivers, conclusions can be drawn about the impact of financial incentives on 
motivation and the types of project initiatives that should be considered by client 
managers when designing incentives as a part of an overall procurement approach. 
 
The case study interprets the motivation drivers according to a conceptual framework 
developed by Rose (2008). This framework represents the first time that both 
economic and psychological perspectives of motivation have been integrated to 
investigate financial incentives in a construction project environment. Figure 1 below 
provides a summary of the main features of the model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework Summary - Motivation on Construction Projects 
 
 
 
According to the conceptual framework, project-based motivation towards the 
voluntary incentive goals is determined by the features of (i) the financial incentive 
design and; (ii) the supporting procurement initiatives. Within these features lie 
specific motivation drivers that can be uncovered by exploring two broad motivation 
indicators developed from a review of the organizational motivation literature – (1) 
goal commitment and (2) organizational justice. Motivated project participants put 
greater effort into achieving specified performance standards that exceed business as 
usual. This effort will then impact on project performance. Readers interested in 
greater detail concerning the conceptual framework are referred to Rose (2008), as 
space limitations here preclude a full review.  
 
 
METHODS 
 
In response to the identified knowledge deficits, a case study is employed here to 
identify the project drivers that can underpin motivation towards voluntary incentive 
goals. By identifying the drivers, conclusions can be drawn about the impact of 
financial incentives on motivation and what project initiatives should be considered by 
client managers when designing incentive-based procurement approaches. A case 
study approach was seen as the best method given the complexity of construction 
infrastructure project environments, and the need for in-depth understanding of the 
dynamics surrounding project-based motivation in order to effectively scope and 
identify drivers. This case study method promised to result in more valid and reliable 
findings than a broader quantitative approach, because we were interested in 
understanding the detail of complex processes underpinning project motivation. A 
questionnaire was developed based on the conceptual framework shown in Figure 1. 
Questions were about the case project, and comprised three main groups (1) structural 
details of the project, (2) respondent’s goal commitment, and (3) perceptions of 
organizational justice. Further, organizational justice questions comprised three types: 
distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice. The case study 
presented in this paper was selected in a purposive manner, as it represents an 
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example of the successful design and implementation of a financial incentive system 
as part of the overall project procurement approach. 
 
Case study findings were triangulated across the following data sources: semi-
structured face-to-face interviews, project and contractual documentation (including 
project briefs and minutes from meetings), industry publications, and a site visit. 
Extensive preliminary data were collected, which helped shape the interviews. The 
interviewees comprised eight senior managers; two from each of four key stakeholder 
types (client, head contractor, consultants and subcontractors) who were heavily 
involved in the procurement and delivery of the case project. All interviews were in-
person and ranged from 60 to 90 minutes duration, based on structured and un-
structured questions. Raw interview data was analyzed using content analysis. This 
involved manually aggregating and categorizing responses from the interview 
transcripts and the secondary data to identify the key motivation drivers. The 
identification and refinement of driver categories was achieved by inductive coding. 
The primary data amounted to approximately 8,000 words contained in interview 
transcripts. The coding process involved interpretation of each interviewee’s transcript 
and each emerging coding category was revised and refined until clear lines could be 
drawn between the categories (motivation drivers). Care was taken to identify driver 
categories that covered all instances, were limited in number and were mutually 
exclusive. Due to the subjective nature of content analysis, an ‘expert panel’ was 
formed to test content analysis accuracy and ensure inadvertent bias was minimized. 
The category allocations of the three expert panel members reflected over 80% 
accuracy, providing evidence of the reliability of the coding.  
 
 
CASE PROJECT DETAILS 
 
The project involved the design and construction of an AU$80 million hospital 
campus in a regional city in New South Wales, Australia. The new hospital campus, 
with a final floor space of approximately 25,800 square meters, was built on a 19.2 
hectare greenfield site. The hospital was designed to meet the functional health model 
of care set out by the New South Wales State government (the ‘client’). The primary 
objective of the project was to procure a facility that provided ‘patient focused care’ 
while maximizing the delivery of health services and replacing an existing base 
hospital that was not meeting its functionality requirements. The hospital campus was 
constructed over 36 months and was officially completed in 2001.  
 
A Managing Contractor – Design and Construction Management (MC-D&CM) 
procurement approach was employed, for the first time by the client. The managing 
contractor was paid a management fee for providing input to the development of 
design and documentation and managing the construction up to the commissioning 
and handover stage. As is standard for this form of procurement, the contractor was 
also reimbursed the cost of construction, which was capped at the nominated Target 
Construction Sum (TCS) amount, and managed through an open-book process. 
 
The managing contractor held the majority of risk for construction cost overruns, as 
they were not entitled to price adjustments under the nominated TCS. Under this 
arrangement the contractor warranted that the client would pay no more than the 
approved TCS. To minimize the cost overrun risks, the client gave the contractor the 
opportunity to develop the TCS during design development and to provide their 
exclusions from the design scope, which would allow them to build the campus within 
the client’s budget. This was followed by open-book negotiation of the excluded 
scope items between the managing contractor and client representatives, and the 
negotiated TCS sum was established for the construction stage. 
 
Also, according to the contract, all parties were required to act in good faith. This 
meant that the client representatives were obliged to assist the managing contractor in 
sourcing cost-saving options, which would provide an opportunity for them to secure 
a share of savings around the nominated TCS – as long as quality and functionality 
requirements were not negatively impacted. This was put into practice when the 
project team (the client, managing contractor and consultant representatives) 
undertook value engineering exercises to identify design opportunities to bring the 
project costs down and improve design buildability, with the final approval from the 
client representatives. 
 
The procurement approach also included a comprehensive relationship management 
process. The relationship management process comprised project advisory group team 
meetings with the managing contractor, consultants and client representatives to 
promote the procurement approach and encourage the development of a cooperative 
project team. These meetings also involved the end-user representatives, and formally 
managed team relationships and problem resolution processes to prevent disputes, 
supported by the expert dispute determination process laid out in the general 
conditions of contract. 
 
The management structure was a traditional hierarchy with the novation of design 
consultants. The project consultants were engaged at the end of the master 
planning/conceptual design stage. They were responsible for the development and 
documentation of design, under the management of the client for ‘Stage One’ of the 
project. The managing Contractor was then engaged at the end of Schematic Design. 
When the managing contractor was re-engaged for ‘Stage Two’ (early design 
documentation), the key design consultants’ contracts were transferred to the 
managing contractor under the same contractual conditions (and fee structures) they 
had with the client, to complete construction documentation and provide input in the 
construction process. The subcontractors were engaged by the managing contractor at 
the end of design documentation and at the beginning of the construction stage and did 
not have significant input to design development. The management structure and 
engagements in each of the project stages are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Case project management structure and engagement stages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROJECT STAGES (not to scale) 
 
 
The major project goals were quality and functionality, determined by end-user 
satisfaction, and cost performance, assessed around the management of the TCS. 
Meeting the time schedule was also an important goal to the project, but was not a part 
of the incentive approach on this project. 
 
According to the client representatives, an unusual feature of the project was the 
requirement to consult and manage a large number of user group concerns in the 
development and documentation of design. Forty different user groups were consulted 
up to five times each over a period of 24 weeks (design development and 
documentation). Consultation continued throughout construction, particularly to 
minimize disruption of medical services in relocating patients from the old hospital 
facility to the new campus. Also, according to the client representatives, a high level 
of end-user satisfaction in the campus was also achieved through ongoing satisfaction 
surveys, in comparison to similar new health facilities procured by the client. The 
client representatives attributed the achievement of this project goal to the levels of 
end-user input in the design and the success of the design and construction delivery 
process. They also perceived value in the project team’s approach to long-term water 
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and electricity costs, in particular the managing contractor’s design input which 
resulted in forecasted life cycle cost savings.  
 
As a major goal, cost performance was linked to the financial incentive approach, 
through a 50% share of savings arrangement based around the negotiated TCS. The 
incentive was intended to reward the contractor for a smooth, well-managed project 
without disruption. The client representatives believed that the incentive could 
motivate the contractor to improve their profit margin through their share of savings 
reward, and it could also allow a share to be returned to the client and redistributed 
back into the hospital, providing a value-adding opportunity. Therefore, the incentive 
was intended to motivate not only the contractor, but also the client representatives to 
return a share back into the project. The ‘share of savings’ incentive design offered to 
the contractor was based on 50% of the difference between the amount of the TCS 
(adjusted in accordance with the contract) and the Actual Construction Sum (client-
approved actual costs of construction), capped at A$1 million. The cap of AU$1 
million was determined by the client representatives as an appropriate reward for 
contractor performance. By the conclusion of the project in December 2001, the 
project participants had achieved approximately AU$1.2 million in savings below the 
TCS. Therefore, the contractor received AU$600,000 and the remainder was 
reallocated back into the project by the client. 
 
The client representatives stated the managing contractor performed well throughout 
the project, particularly in cost performance.  However, they did identify problems in 
maintaining this momentum after the project had reached Practical Completion (PC). 
Several large defects were not rectified early in the defects liability period and 
required the client representatives to continuously follow-up on rectification works. 
Eventually these issues were resolved, but late in the defects liability period. Although 
this was a problem, the client representatives did not believe it tarnished the overall 
success of the project. 
 
 
MOTIVATION DRIVERS 
 
The motivation drivers that were nominated by interviewees as contributing to the 
successful achievement of the project goals are examined here. These drivers emerged 
from the case interviews, which were based on background data and the two 
motivation indicators shown in Figure 1 – goal commitment and organizational 
justice. Again, following Figure 1, the identified drivers are discussed under two 
broad classes – (i) those motivation drivers that were associated with effective design 
of the incentive system, and (ii) those associated with the procurement initiatives that 
positively supported the incentive approach on the case project. Discussion of the 
motivation drivers below provides guidance for client managers in designing 
procurement approaches that incorporate similar financial incentive arrangements.  
 
Financial Incentive Design 
Although the amount of incentive reward on offer under the share of savings was 
motivating (AU$1 million), the design of the incentive mechanism featured one key 
element that constrained it. According to the consultant representatives and managing 
contractor representative one, the single goal of the incentive – to achieve savings 
below the nominated TCS - limited the opportunities for the contractor to be rewarded 
in other performance areas. According to one of the managing contractor 
representatives, this resulted in a perception of unfairness in how overall performance 
was rewarded. Additionally, the consultant representatives believed that by focusing 
on a single incentive goal, performance could easily be distorted, to the potential 
detriment of other performance areas such as quality.  
 
Procurement Initiatives 
Five project procurement initiatives were found to support the financial incentive 
approach applied in the case project. They are: 1) an equitable risk profile; 2) variation 
approval; 3) value-based tender; 4) team workshops; and 5) future work opportunities.   
 
1) Equitable risk profile 
All interviewees, except one of the consultant representatives, perceived that allowing 
the managing contractor to negotiate the TCS with the client during design 
development provided the financial flexibility to focus their efforts on achieving 
project savings and sharing in those savings under the incentive. This resulted in 
strong expectations that cost savings could be achieved, promoting goal commitment, 
and also promoted a perception of fairness in how the contract risk was managed. The 
subcontractor representatives believed that the managing contractor’s ‘comfortable’ 
financial position allowed them to place greater emphasis on selecting capable 
subcontractors and therefore, to have greater security over subcontractor performance, 
lowering construction risks. 
 
These results suggest that the managing contractor’s motivation was significantly 
influenced by how their financial risks were managed under the contract. A perceived 
readiness of the client to assist the contractor in minimizing the potential for TCS 
overruns (through the negotiation process) promoted motivation and commitment. 
Motivation was enhanced through the awareness that if procurement was efficiently 
managed, the managing contractor could bring the project costs under TCS and secure 
a share of the incentive, outside external project influences such as market price rises. 
 
2) Variation approval  
The client, managing contractor and consultant all noted that the client representatives 
developed a clear set of procedures to handle requests for changes and variation 
approvals. They perceived this was a positive driver to the project participants’ 
motivation as it prevented ambiguity and disputes over variations above TCS scope, 
therefore providing some assurance that fair and reasonable variation’s would be paid. 
This was perceived to promote incentive goal commitment as it increased the 
expectancy that the TCS could be preserved and project savings could be achieved.  
 
3) Value-based tender  
All interviewees, except one of the two consultant representatives, noted that the 
selection of the project team on both price and non-price criteria (under a value-based 
tender - i.e. selection of tenderers on the value they would contribute to the project) 
was a positive driver that promoted the motivation towards the incentive goal. The 
evaluation of ability, reputation and experience, as well as the competitiveness of the 
managing contractor and consultant fees during the invitation to tender and tender 
assessment stages, promoted a desire by the team to prove they had been rightly 
selected. This motivated the project team to strive for the project goals (including 
achieving construction savings). 
 
4) Team workshops 
 According to the managing contractor and consultant representatives, the initial 
teamwork meetings assisted in the development of the project relationships. These 
meetings were seen to promote personal commitment to the project goals, including 
the delivery of the project below budget (i.e. ‘share of savings’ incentive goal). 
According to one of the managing contractor representatives, the formation of a 
harmonious team was largely the result of the high level of professionalism of the 
team members and contributed to successfully bring the project under budget. The 
consultant representatives also noted that the relationship between the project 
participants was an essential component of the successful delivery of the project and 
complemented the objectives of the incentive.  
 
5) Future work opportunities 
All eight interviewees perceived incentive participant motivation was strongly 
promoted by the knowledge that the delivery of the project above the minimum 
standards (particularly below budget) would translate into future work opportunities 
with the client. Therefore, the attractiveness of achieving project savings was 
increased for the managing contractor and consultants through the potential for future 
work opportunities.  
 
The managing contractor and consultant representatives also observed that there are 
very few contractors who have experience in procuring Australian hospital projects. 
Therefore, reputation and experience were seen to be particularly important in this 
area. This driver was also related to the managing contractor representatives’ 
perception that the client representatives valued their effort and would recommend 
them for future projects if they achieved high performance, intensifying their incentive 
to deliver the project below budget. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
According to the project participants, the case project was successful, in large part 
because of the incentive approach. Project success was recognized through the 
achievement of approximately AU$1.2 million in savings below the TCS, which was 
shared 50:50 between the contractor and the client. However, the results also suggest 
that there was potential to improve the impact of incentives by incorporating a 
multiple goal system - increasing the reward opportunities for the contractor and 
decreasing the potential for over-emphasis on a single incentive performance goal. 
This suggests that incentives do not necessarily need to be large, but they do need to 
be strategically applied across key performance areas to prevent potential distortion 
and manipulation and promote a ‘well rounded’ approach to performance evaluation. 
 
In summary, motivation towards the incentive goals was critically supported by the 
following procurement initiatives: 
 
 equitable risk management of the MC-D&CM contract, promoted particularly 
through the TCS negotiation process during early design development; 
 clear documentation of ‘request for change’ procedures and supportive 
variation approval processes, 
  value-based tender selection that comprised price and non-price selection 
criteria; 
 initial teamwork meetings intended to develop positive relationships between 
project team members; and 
 potential for future work opportunities. 
 
Goal commitment was a strong motivator on the project - all of the drivers were 
connected with goals in some way. Despite the problems associated with the single 
goal incentive on the case project, the participants remained committed to securing 
project savings because of the positive drivers listed above. The TCS negotiation 
process was a particularly important motivator, as it led to the perception of equitable 
risk allocation. The project relationship that was formed through the teamwork 
meetings was also critical, supported as it was by the value-based tender evaluation 
process, and the potential for future work. 
 
A key finding in the research was that the managing contractor’s motivation was not 
negatively impacted by their responsibility of the majority of construction risks 
because of the perceived equity in which the TCS was developed and negotiated.  
Thus, as the TCS was fairly negotiated, it positively promoted motivation, and offered 
the contractor greater ability to predict and manage construction costs and minimize 
cost overrun risks. These results suggest that when applying a ‘share of savings’ 
incentive within a similar project environment, it is important for client managers to 
provide the managing contractor enough time and information to accurately estimate 
construction costs prior to price submission. This can minimize the potential for 
uncontrollable price rises, which can have a negative impact on motivation. 
Encouraging accurate cost estimates can positively promote the project relationship, 
as the contractor is less inclined to focus on preserving their financial position and 
more inclined to strengthen the relationship with the client, which can increase goal 
commitment. 
 
The contractors on the project felt that the consultants and subcontractors should have 
shared in the incentive reward. Their inclusion in the share of savings may have 
increased their motivation to assist the managing contractor in the value engineering 
process and lowering construction costs. However, the consultant and subcontractor 
representatives said their goal commitment wasn’t decreased by their lack of inclusion 
in the formal incentive arrangement, indicating that they were motivated by other 
project drivers such as the project relationship and future work opportunities. 
 
This finding provides detail to Bresnen and Marshall (2000) assertion that incentive 
effectiveness is moderated by the features of its design and the nature of the context in 
which they are implemented. Therefore, in order to optimize their effectiveness, 
clients require a clear understanding of how the incentive aligns with the overall 
procurement approach. The case study results support this argument, where the 
managing contractor valued the inclusion of the incentive in the project and found the 
financial reward on offer motivating, however, placed greater emphasis on the project 
management processes that supported the incentive. This suggests that it is important 
for client managers, under similar project conditions, to consider the overall 
risk/reward strategy, including future work opportunities as a motivator when 
implementing a financial incentive. The incentive should not be seen as an 
independent initiative, but as an integral part of a suite of project management 
initiatives that promote motivation towards the achievement of the overall project 
goals. 
 
Although results relate specifically to the context in which the case project was 
undertaken, the recommendations are likely to apply to similar procurement 
approaches that incorporate incentives, across different types of construction assets, 
and for private-sector clients. Further research is required to provide more robust 
findings in terms of generalisability.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bower, D., Ashby, G., Gerald, K. and Smyk, W. (2002) “Incentive mechanisms for 
project success”, Journal of Management in Engineering, 18(1), pp. 37-43. 
 
Bresnen, M. and Marshall, N. (2000) "Motivation, commitment and the use of 
incentives in partnerships and alliances”, Construction Management and Economics, 
18(5), pp. 587-598. 
 
Howard, W. E., Bell, L. C. and McCormick, R. E. (1997) “Economic principals of 
contractor compensation”, Journal of Management in Engineering, 13(5), pp. 81-89. 
 
Kadefors, A. (2004) “Trust in project relationships - inside the black box.” 
International Journal of Project Management, 22(3), pp. 175-182. 
 
Rose, T.M. (2008) “The impact of financial incentive mechanisms on motivation in 
Australian large non-residential building projects”, Unpublished dissertation, 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
